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ABSTRACT
GERALD WALTMAN III: The History and Consequences of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Under the direction of John Czarnetzky)
The purpose of this research and thesis is to explore the intended and
unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act
arose from a series of financial scandals including those that happened at
Enron and WorldCom. The Act is one of the most wide-sweeping pieces
of financial legislation in the country’s history, and it has drastically
changed the way that publicly traded companies and their auditors
conduct their business. A significant challenge to the Act was heard by
the United States Supreme Court, and the Court held a portion of the Act
to be in violation of the United States Constitution but allowed the
remainder to stand.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the consequences, Intended and
othenwise, of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and provide information about the
history of financial regulation In the United States, the financial environment that
lead to the passage of the Act, specifically the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
and the role of accountants throughout this and other cases. Understanding the
history of regulation and the financial environment at the turn of the millennium Is
essential to understanding why Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, and an
understanding of the ‘SA/hy” of Sarbanes-Oxley is vital to understanding If It has
had the effects its authors desired. It could be that Sarbanes-Oxley increases
the value of companies’ financial information and auditors’ services, or it could be
that it simply adds layers of red tape that will do little to curb corruption that
pervades our corporate culture.^
These effects have drastically altered how publicly traded companies
structure their internal controls and how they communicate relevant and reliable
financial information to users of that financial information. As greatly as publicly
traded companies have been affected, the auditors of those companies have
been affected equally if not more. This work will also detail the changes that
companies and auditors have had to make to be compliant with Sarbanes-Oxley.

Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Feb. 2005)(unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Rochester)(on file with author).

HYPOTHESIS
The author believes that Sarbanes-Oxley has curtailed accounting fraud to
some degree by increasing the oversight that the federal government has over
publicly traded companies and their auditors. The author expects that the field of
auditing publicly traded companies will have been more greatly affected than any
individual company or industry, and the author expect that costs for companies
and auditors will be greater than before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted.
It is difficult to say what crimes Sarbanes-Oxley has prevented, but the
author believe that by highlighting the differences between pre-SOX and postSOX regulations and practices the author can make reasonable conjecture about
how SOX has affected the prosecution and detection of financial crimes. While
the author may find that Sarbanes-Oxley has had a beneficial effect on publicly
traded companies, their auditors, and ultimately the users of financial information,
the author does not believe that any amount of legislation or regulation can drive
corruption from the hearts of men.
SOURCES AND METHODOLGIES
After the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the passage of SarbanesOxley, there Is a wealth of information available about the Act and its
consequences. This work draws on the author’s experience in studying financial
accounting and auditing and research done through financial and legal
periodicals, academic and professional websites, court cases and opinions, and
the text of and commentary about federal statutes. The author draws the
relevant information from these sources and arranges it in this work In an effort to

2

enhance the reader’s understanding of financial regulation of public corporations
and auditors of public corporations. This work is written in the style of a law
journal article, and It is cited In accordance with The Blue Book:A Uniform
System of Citation.
LITERATURE REVIEWS
This document touches briefly on the history of financial regulation, the
environment that lead to Sarbanes-Oxley, basic tenets of the statute itself, and
the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB. This
thesis incorporates these reviews with commentary and discussion from the
author.
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CHAPTER I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 require that companies who issue
securities to file financial statements that come with the opinion of an
independent auditor to be filed as part of the company’s registration and following
reports. The only person who can issue such an opinion to accompany said
financial statements Is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), which is a statelicensed accounting practitioner.^
Before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants(AlCPA) was the highest authority for its members.
Sarbanes-Oxley established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB)to oversee the audits of publicly traded companies by CPAs, but that
will be discussed In greater detail later in this work. Despite the presence of the
PCAOB,the AlCPA still wields considerable influence, and its Statements on
Auditing Standards(SASs) continue to be used by the PCAOB and CPAs. Such
standards include the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards(GAAS)for
general qualifications and conduct, field work audit performance, and results
reporting.®
Perhaps the greatest asset an auditor can bring to society is an
independent and unbiased opinion. While doctors and lawyers are primarily

^ Alvin A. Arens et al. Auditing and Assurance Services: An Integrated Approach 26-39 (14*^ Edition Prentice Hall)
0
Alvin A. Arens et al, Auditing and Assurance Services: An integrated Approach 26-39 (14**’ Edition Prentice Hall)
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responsible for looking after the best interests of their clients and patients,
auditors are also valuable because they look after the best Interest of the users
of the financial information provided by the auditor’s clients. It must follow then
that for auditors to be able to adequately and fairly evaluate their client’s
information that the auditor must be independent. For over a century auditors
were able to govern themselves, but, as a new millennium dawned, a series of
financial scandals rocked the confidence and trust that are essential to the
successful course of an audit. Therefore, legislation was enacted to protect the
independence of auditors."^
The largest two scandals that contributed to the environment of corruption
are the ones that occurred at Enron and WorldCom, and the events surrounding
them are described below. These are two of the largest scandals, financial or
otherwise, that have rocked the American people In the last century, and one
hopes they do not set the tone for this new century to be one of corruption and
bad business. However, with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, it would seem we
are taking steps to Increase accountability and good business practices.

^ Id.
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CHAPTER II
THE ENVIRONMENT THAT LEAD TO SARBANES-OXLEY
ENRON
While there were some smaller financial scandals that rocked the public’s
faith In accounting, the scandal of Enron Corporation was the beginning of a new
era of financial regulation.®
Enron Corporation, an energy company that expanded into commodities
and services, was at one time the seventh largest company in the United States
and commanded a $70 billion market value. At the time of its fall, Enron was the
largest scandal in the history of the United States.® As a giant of the American
economic landscape, Enron was expected to meet certain earnings targets for Its
shareholders. When it became likely that those expectations would not be met,
Enron’s management used a complex financial structure and numerous offbalance sheet transactions to hide its less than ideal performance.^
Perhaps the three most notorious names related to Enron are Ken Lay,
the former chairman, Jeff Skilling, the former chief executive officer, and Andrew
Fastow, the former chief financial officer. Lay and Skilling were charged with
lying to Investors and employees about the health of the company, and Fastow
was charged with self-dealing, which means that Enron would enter Into deals
with special purpose entities that Fastow controlled.®

6 cami sultan, Enron’s End, Business Today, Oct. 13. 2004.
‘Relied on Auditors’, Herald Sun (Australia), Apr. 26. 2006.
7 £nron Accountant Jailed for Five Years: Approved Bogus Books, National Post’s Financial Post(Canada), Nov. 16.
2006, at FP 18.
30, 2006.
8 Raphael Grunfield, Laying the Blame for Enron, Legal Week, Mar.
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Despite widespread corruption among Enron’s leadership, there were
cries of concern. Sherron Watkins, a vice-president at the time, brought her
concerns before the company’s audit committee through a memo in October of
2001. Ms. Watkins wrote, “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave
m9

of accounting scandals,

This memo was discussed by the audit committee, but

her concerns and suggestions were rejected. Despite these limited internal cries
for reform, Enron’s top management continued to tout the company’s financial
stability, and they continued to rely on the work of the company’s auditor: Arthur
Andersen.10
Arthur Andersen’s memory will linger in infamy in the minds of
accountants across the world. The firm was charged with obstruction of justice
for destroying and falsifying documents related to their audits of Enron. After its
fall, foreign accounting firms that once partnered with Andersen paid $40 million
11

to pursuant to suits by Enron Investors.
In the wake of the fall of Enron and Andersen, the public trust in the
integrity of accountants, which Is what gives the accounting profession Its value,
was shaken. The trust that the users of financial information have in the integrity
of the services that accountants provide is the very foundation upon which the
profession of accounting is built. However, while Enron was the largest scandal
to date, it was merely setting the stage for an even greater tragedy. The events
that surrounded the fall of telecommunications giant WorldCom would hasten the
® Andrew Clark. Wakeham Brushed Aside Enron’s Crisis Warning, Board Papers Show: Vice-president's Fears of Scandai
WereDismissed: Two Months Later the Energy Company Crashed, The Guardian (London), Apr. 15, 2006, at 27.
Raphael Grunfield, Laying the Biame for Enron, Legal Week, Mar. 30, 2006.
"Jaret Seibert, Enron’s Long Shadow, Daiiy Deal, Jul. 18, 2003.
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passage of what would be one of the most drastic financial reform laws in United
12

States history.

WORLDCOM

WorldCom, at its peak, was the second largest long-distance carrier in the
nation, served over twenty million customers, and provided telecom services to
13

some of the largest companies in the world,

Like Enron before it, WorldCom

was a giant in its industry, and the drive to continue to meet stockholders’
expectation would prove to be just as much of a stumbling block for WorldCom
as it had been for Enron. WorldCom had taken the telecommunications industry
by storm, and its success was due in large part to its charismatic and businesssavvy leader, Bernie Ebbers.
Ebbers, a native Canadian, relocated to Mississippi to play basketball for
Mississippi College in Clinton, Mississippi. After college, Ebbers invested in a
number of hotels, and his successful investments brought him to the attention of
a group of men who were interested in basing a telecommunications company in
Mississippi. The men drew up the plans for what would become Long-Distance
Discount Services(LDDS), and with Ebbers at the helm the company grew
rapidly by buying other telecommunications companies and expanding its
influence. By the mid-1990s, LDDS was renamed WorldCom and took its place
14

as a leader among the world’s telecom companies.

Floyd Norris, New Arbiters of Auditing, The New York Times, Oct. 28, 2002, at 1.
Andrew Backover et al, WorldCom Finds Accounting Fraud, USA Today, Jun. 26, 2002, at 1
Tim Padgett and Alice Jackson Baughn, The Rise and Fall of Bernie Ebbers, Time Europe, May 13, 2002, at 54.
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However, Ebbers became enamored with making deals rather than
running his company. He began borrowing money from WorldCom, and at the
time of his resignation he still owed the company $366 million. Making such
large loans to the CEO was not a healthy decision for WorldCom, especially as
the demand for telecom services shrunk during 2000. The numerous expansions
and acquisitions further hindered the company’s success. The individual
acquisitions continued to function almost as they had before being acquired, and
the resulting lack of efficiency lead to a complicated corporate reporting structure
that further harmed a reeling company. WorldCom, which was struggling with a
stock price below $1 and over $25 million in debt, was desperate, and desperate
15

times will drive men and women to desperate measures.
Throughout 2001 and the first quarter of 2002, WorldCom engaged in
financial fraud that rivaled and possibly surpassed what had happened at Enron.
Through the manipulation of ordinary expenses and capital expenditures,
WorldCom accountants were able to generate extra cash flow of $3.9 billion over
the five quarters. Arthur Andersen, infamous due to its involvement with the
Enron scandal, audited WorldCom’s 2001 financial statements and failed to
16

detect the fraud.

Over the course of the investigation and trial, several

WorldCom employees, including the former Controller, Chief Financial Officer,
and Chief Executive Officer would be sentenced to serve time In prison for
intentionally falsifying financial information and misleading the users of that
Information.
Tim Padgett and Alice Jackson Baughn, The Rise and Fall of Bemie Ebbers, Time Europe, May 13, 2002, at 54.
Andrew Backover et al, WorldCom Finds Accounting Fraud, USA Today, Jun. 26, 2002, at 1
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Another titanic scandal shattered the public’s trust and spurred Congress
to enact sweeping financial reform legislation. The fact that the same accounting
firm had audited both Enron and WorldCom and could be seen as complicit In the
first fraud and incompetent for not detecting the second was a terrible blow to the
perception of accountants as trustworthy professionals, and the terms of the
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act are set forth to
increase accountability for management and auditors alike.
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CHAPTER III
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as we know It today is the product of accounting
reform bills proposed by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael
Oxley in 2002. The Act was passed on July 25, 2002 and was signed into law on
July 30, 2002. The Act is considered to be the most significant piece of financial
17

legislation since the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934.
When President George W. Bush signed the Act into law he said it was one of
the “most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since Franklin
Ills

Roosevelt was president.
A SUMMARY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
The Act contains eleven Titles that deal with the (l)Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board,(2)auditor independence,(3)corporate
responsibility,(4)enhanced disclosure,(5)analyst conflicts of interest,
(6)commission resources and authority,(7)studies and reports,(8)corporate and
criminal fraud accountability,(9)enhancements of white collar crime penalties,
19

(lO)corporate tax returns, and (11)corporate fraud accountability.

Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Feb. 2005)(unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Rochester)(on file with author).
Sarbanes-Oxley: Five Years Under the Thumb. The Economist, Jul. 26, 2007.
Alvin A. Arens et al. Auditing and Assurance Services: An Integrated Approach 26-39 (14"’ Edition Prentice Hall)
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Perhaps the two hardest Titles to swallow for auditors and companies are
the first and fourth respectively, but all the Titles are summarized below. In the
Interest of time and space, not all Sections of every Title are summarized.
TITLE I

From 1887 until 2002, the accounting profession enjoyed a large
degree of autonomy In ordering its affairs and enforcing Its standards for the
good of its professional members and the users of financial information.
However, in 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley gave the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants a government boss In the form of the Public Companies
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley created the
PCAOB, which is under the authority of the SEC, to register audit-performing
public accounting firms, create standards for the preparation and issuance of
audit reports, and investigate accounting firms and issue penalties where
warranted. The PCAOB also conduct inspections to verify that CPAs are in
compliance with professional standards and firm policies. The PCAOB is
20

composed of five members, and two of the members are CPAs.

It seems odd that only two members of the PCAOB can be CPAs when
the entity is the overseer of the accounting profession. It Is possible the authors
of the law intend this to give the board two members who are familiar with the
discipline while limiting the number of conflicts of interest between the CPA

“Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 107-204(2012) 1 use §101 (2012)

12

members and the CPAs in the field. It could also serve the function of checking
the power that the profession might exert over their regulators.
TITLE II

The most valuable thing that an auditor brings to the table when he or she
issues an audit report on the financial statements or internal controls of a
company Is his or her independence. This can be even more important than the
knowledge, training, and experience of the auditor, which would all be worthless
to users of financial statements if the auditor they are relying upon is not
independent of his or her client. Therefore, it is no surprise that Sarbanes-Oxley
contains an Title that deals with strengthening the requirements for an auditor to
be independent.
Section 201 of Title II amends Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to include an extended list of services that firms are prohibited to offer to
their audit clients. By restricting the services that accounting firms can offer their
audit clients, the firm’s Independence cannot be compromised by the possibility
of income or threat of income being withheld. The following services are
prohibited from being offered by accounting firms to their audit clients.
1. Bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client’s accounting
records or financial statements
2. Financial Information systems design and implementation services
3. Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-inkind reports
4. Actuarial Services
5. Internal audit outsourcing services
6. Management functions or human resources
7. Broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services
13

8. Legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit
9. Any other services that the Board determines, by regulation, is
impermissible^^
Section 202 requires that the Audit Committee of an audit client’s Board of
22

Directors must approve the work of independent auditors,

Section 203 requires
23

that the lead partner on an audit engagement must be rotated every five years.
Section 204 requires the independent auditors to give their reports to the audit
24

committee rather than the management of the client,

Section 206 forbids an

accounting firm from performing and audit for a company whose chief executive
officer, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, controller, or a person in
any equivalent position was employed by the auditing firm in for the one year
period before the audit of said client company. A conflict of interest also exists
under Section 206 if a former lead partner, concurring partner, or audit team
member from the auditing firm joins the client company in a role that has
responsibility for financial reporting within a year preceding the current audit’s
Initiation.25 Section 209 instructs State regulatory authorities to make their own
judgments about the applicable standards for non registered-firms of medium or
small size.26
Establishing the audit committee as the primary receiver of an auditor’s
report increases independence by reducing the possibility that management will
exert inappropriate influence over the findings of an audit and lead to the

21
22 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15

U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)2 USC §201 (2012)
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)2 USC §202(2012)
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)2 USC §203(2012)
24
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C.§§ 107-204(2012)2 USC §204(2012)
25
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)2 USC §206(2012)
26
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)2 USC §209(2012)
23
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proliferation of inaccurate information that will mislead investors and regulators.
The year-long “cooling off period” promotes Independence by reducing the
likelihood of a conflict of Interest arising from a partner being able to join a
company whose audit he oversees while he might still exert influence over the
outcome of the audit. For example, the partner might be enticed by the chance
of employment and allow his professional judgment to be Impaired by the offer.
TITLE III

Title III establishes the responsibilities that issuers of financial statements
have for insuring the validity of said financial statements. One of the major issues
in the Enron and WorldCom cases was that “higher-ups” In the companies were
either complicit in or ignorant of the issuance of false or misleading financial
statements'^, and Title III sets standards that are aimed at preventing or limiting
executive ignorance or encouragement to enable fraudulent accounting
practices.
Section 301 of Title III adds several lines of text to Section 10A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that change the nature of an issuer’s audit
committee. Those paragraphs are summarized in Table 1 below.

Jaret Seibert, Enron’s Long Shadow. Daily Deal, Jul. 18, 2003.
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Table 1: Summaries of Paragraphs (1) through (6) of Section 301
Paragraph
Number
1

Requirements
●
●

2

●

●

3

●

●

●
4

●

●
5

●

6

●
●

The national securities exchanges will not permit the listing of
companies that are not in compliance with paragraphs (2) through (6)
The SEC shall provide the issuer with an opportunity to correct any
defects that keep the issuer from being in compliance with paragraphs
(2) through (6)
Each issuer’s audit committee will be responsible for appointing,
compensating, and overseeing the work of the issuer’s independent
auditors
The audit committee will be responsible for resolving all conflicts and
disagreements between the issuer’s management and the independent
auditors regarding financial reporting
Each member of the audit committee will be a member of the issuer’s
board of directors, and each member will maintain his or her
independence in all other regards
To be independent, the member of the audit committee will not receive
any fees other than those he or she is due as a member of the board of
directors or be an affiliated with the issuer in any capacity other than as
a member of the board of directors
An issuer may be granted an exemption with regard to relationships of
the audit committee at the discretion of the SEC
The audit committee will establish procedures for receiving, retaining,
and treating complaints received regarding accounting, internal
controls, and auditing procedures
The audit committee will establish procedures for receiving confidential
or anonymous information from the issuer’s employees
The audit committee has the right to engage independent counsel and
other advisers as it sees fit to the execution of its duties
The issuer will make funds available for the payment of the Independent
auditors
The issuer will make funds available for the payment of independent
counselors and advisers retained under paragraph (5)

16

These paragraphs summarized in Table 1 empower the audit committee
of an issuing company’s board of directors to retain and compensate
independent auditors for the company and counselors and advisors for the audit
committee. It also establishes the audit committee as the arbitrator of disputes
between independent auditors and the company’s management and as the
28

primary receiver of the findings of the independent auditors.
This power and autonomy allow the audit committee to more effectively
protect the integrity of audits performed by independent auditors, and the
provisions allowing the audit committee to have their own counselors and
advisors gives them the tools to better detect possible wrongdoings of company
management and protect themselves, the company, and its shareholders from
said wrongdoings. Mandating that independent auditors report directly to the
audit committee prevents the possibility that management will alter the findings of
an audit before It reaches the audit committee, and giving the audit committee
the authority to resolve disputes between the Independent auditors and the
management prevents the management from inhibiting the work of the auditors.
For example, if a company accountant refuses to comply with an auditor’s
request and the company’s controller was the sole arbiter of disputes then the
controller might not compel the accountant to comply with the request if he was
complicit with what the accountant was trying to hide. As it stands, the audit
committee can order the accountant to provide with auditors with whatever
information they might need.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)3 USC §301 (2012)
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Section 302 dictates that the chief executive and chief financial officers, or
persons who fulfill similar functions, for companies filing periodic reports under
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 must certify in the
annual or quarterly reports of the company that they have reviewed the report,
that the report, to the best of their knowledge, does not contain any false
statements of material facts or omissions of material facts, and that the report, to
the best of their knowledge, is an accurate statement of the financial condition
and results of operation of the company. By signing the report the officers
indicate that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining Internal
controls, that internal controls are designed to ensure that material Information Is
made known to the officers, that the internal controls have been evaluated within
ninety days prior to the Issuance of the report, and that their report on the
effectiveness of the controls is based on that evaluation. The signing officers
also certify that they have brought all deficiencies and fraud, regardless of
materiality, to the attention of the audit committee of the board of directors. They
29

also indicate whether or not significant changes were made to internal controls.
Some may see requiring senior officers of a company to certify the
financial reports of their companies as a rubber-stamp measure, but it is more

than that. Requiring senior officers to certify that they have reviewed the reports
before they are issued adds a layer of accountability to financial reporting that
was not there before. If nothing else, it makes the responsibility for the accuracy
of financial statements a personal issue for the chief executive officer, whereas
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)3 USC §302(2012)

18

his or her focus in the past might have simply been to maximize the profits of the
company. Now he or she must put his or her assets, reputation, and possibly
freedom on the line to verify that his or her company presents itself fairly and
honestly to the users of Its financial statements.
Section 304 makes it a criminal act for an officer of director of an issuer to
fraudulently influence, coerce, or manipulate a CPA who Is auditing the financial
statements of the company for the purpose of making said financial statements
30

materially misleading.

TITLE IV

Title IV primarily deals with increasing the disclosures that are required In
periodic reports. Section 401 outlines that all adjustments to financial statements
be included in periodic reports, that all material off-balance sheet transactions be
disclosed, that pro forma (estimated)figures must be truthful and reconciled with
the financial condition of the results of the Issuer’s operations. Section 401 also
requires that the SEC investigate special purpose entities that might be used for
31

off-balance sheet transactions.

Section 402 deals primarily with restricting the possibility for the existence
of conflicts of Interest. Specifically, companies are forbidden from making loans
32

or extending lines of credit to their officers or directors, Section 404 requires
that a report on the internal controls In place in a company must be included in Its

30

32

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)3 USC §304(2012)
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)4 USC §401 (2012)
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)4 USC §402(2012)
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financial reports, and the management of the company is responsible for
implementing adequate internal controls.^^ Section 405 specifies that companies
must disclose their codes of ethics, and it establishes that such codes must
promote honest and ethical conduct of employees, management, and directors of
each issuer.34
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
ordered the SEC to conduct a study on the costs of complying with Section
404(b) and how those costs might be reduced while still providing adequate
protection for investors. There was concern that the high costs of compliance
with Section 404(b) might keep new companies from listing themselves on United
States exchanges. However, the study showed the SEC that the costs of
compliance had declined since the Implementation of SOX, and that the costs of
compliance were not major factors for companies when they chose to list on
exchanges. The study also determined that financial statements are more
reliable when an auditor assesses a company’s Internal controls on financial
reporting, and the study determined that the investing public generally found the
auditor’s reports on internal controls to be beneficial. While the SEC
recommended that the existing requirements under Section 404(b) be left alone,
the Dodd-Frank Act added Section 404(c), which exempts large accelerated filers
35

and accelerated filers from Section 404(b).

TITLE V
33

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)4 USC §404(2012)
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)4 USC §402(2012)
Nathan M. Bisk, CPA Review 40-16, 41’^ed., 2012
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..

The lack of objectivity among financial analysts was one of the key factors
in the downfall of WorldCom and other scandals. Financial analysts who were
employed by investment banks, and they would sing the praises of companies
whose money was handled by the same Investment banks. The information
provided by these analysts was of little legitimate use to the investing public, and
Title V addresses the issue of analyst conflicts of interest so that they might
provide information free from more reliable information.
Section 501 prohibits research reports to be Issued by employees of a
broker or dealer that is also engaged in investment banking, and it stipulates that
analysts cannot be compensated by anyone engaged in Investment banking. It
also limits the time periods in which research reports can be issued and
establishes safeguards to maintain a financial analyst’s functions separate from
any investment banking activities of his or her firm. Also, any debt or equity that
36

would tie an analyst to an issuing firm must be disclosed to the SEC.

’Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)5 USC §501 (2012)
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TITLE VI

Section 601 of Title VI provides an initial $776,000,000 to carry out the
added functions, powers, and duties of the SEC established by Sarbanes-Oxley,
and it provided for the addition of at least 200 additional professionals to better
37

oversee. Investigate, and discipline auditors,

Section 602 gives the SEC

authority to prohibit a practitioner from representing a client before the SEC if the
practitioner is found to not have the necessary qualifications, to have engaged in
unethical conduct, to have intentionally violated or abetted another in the
38

violation of any provision of securities laws.
TITLE VII

Title VII requires that the Comptroller General of the United States to
investigate the effects of the diminished number of public accounting firms might
have had on the quality of audit services offered by said firms. Specifically, the
investigation should reveal what factors lead to the many consolidations of firms.
If the consolidations have impacted the domestic and international capital
markets, and if there can be any solutions to any problems that might be
identified. This is primarily to determine if a lack of competition has led to higher
costs for audit services, lower qualities of audit services, a lack of Independence
39

among auditors, and a lack of choice of auditors for companies.
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TITLE VIII

Title VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley is the teeth of the Act. Section 802 imposes
severe criminal penalties on anyone who knowingly “alters, destroys, mutilates,
conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation
or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States or any case filed under Title XI, or in relation to or
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this Title,
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” The Title also requires that auditors
of issuing companies must maintain their work papers relating to the audit for up
to 5 years after the end of the fiscal period in which the audit was concluded.
Anyone who willfully destroys said working papers will be fined, imprisoned for up
to 10 years, or both. The punishment for destroying evidence can be evaluated
by the amount of evidence, the degree to which the evidence is essential to the
investigation, the planning involved in the destruction, and if the destruction
40

involved abusing a person’s special skill or position of trust.
Title VIII also establishes the statute of limitations for private actions
claiming that an auditor committed fraud as either 2 years after the discovery of
41

the violation or 5 years after the violation,

Section 807 also criminalizes anyone

who knowingly defrauds or attempts to defraud any person in connection with

40
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any security or obtains or attempts to obtain, by fraudulent means, any money or
42

property in connection with the sale of any security.

These actions may seem harsh, but the preparation and audit of financial
statements is not something to be taken lightly. Even unintentional
misstatements may have disastrous effects on a company’s shareholders, and
the effects can be several magnitudes greater if the misstatements are
intentional. Title VIII shows that actions like those that occurred during Arthur
43

Andersen’s audit of Enron will not be tolerated.

Section 806 provides protection for a group of people who are essential to
the discovery of most instances of financial fraud: whistleblowers. In short,
company management and directors are forbidden from discriminating against an
employee who lawfully provides any person with supervisory authority in the
company, Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, or any Member or
committee of Congress with information or assists In an investigation regarding
what the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of any Federal law
regarding defrauding shareholders or SEC rule or regulation. This protection is
also extended to employees who file or participate in proceedings filed with
regard to any alleged violation of any provision of Federal law or SEC rule or
regulation. If such an employee is subjected to discriminatory treatment or

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,15 U.S.C. §§ 107-204(2012)8 USC §807(2012)
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24

harassment by his or her employer or fellow employees, he or she may file a
44

complaint with the Secretary of Labor.

It is essential to provide protections for “whistleblowers”, because it is their
brave deeds that reveal most cases of fraud. The men and women who put their
careers and livelihoods on the line for the sake of truth and honesty deserve to
be protected for speaking up for what is right. Including protections for
whistleblowers shows the government’s commitment to providing avenues for
individuals to speak up when they know they should.
TITLE IX

Title IX continues in the vein of increasing the government’s crackdown on
violations of federal laws by Increasing the penalties associated with various acts
of “white-collar crime”. For example, the penalty for committing mail and/or wire
fraud before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley was up to 5 years in prison, but now
45

the penalty Is up to 20 years in prison.

Violations of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 now warrant between $100,000 and $500,000 in
fines and up to 10 years in jail, whereas the penalties were between $5,000 and
46

$100,000 in fines and up to one year in jail.
Again, it is important to emphasize the seriousness of financial crimes.
One would hope that companies that issue financial statements and the auditors
who audit them would conduct all of their affairs legally and ethically out of a
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sincere desire to uphold the integrity of their firms. However, it may be that fear
of penalties Is the only way to produce relevant and reliable financial information
across the board if we cannot rely on the consistent ethical actions of the
financial officers of corporations.
TITLE X

Title X, the shortest Title of the Act, mandates that the chief executive
officer of a corporation sign the Federal income tax return of said corporation.
This Is similar to the signing requirements imposed by Title III in that the purpose
Is for the upper management of the company to be involved and concerned with
47

the accurate presentation of the company’s financial position.
It Is not surprising that Sarbanes-Oxley contains a provision that deals
with Federal tax returns. If one thinks the government Is protective of what a
company says in regard to what it owes a shareholder, one should know the
government is especially concerned with what a company says in regard to what
It owes the government.
TITLE XI

Title XI also deals with the consequences of tampering with records,
documents, or other objects that could be used in official proceedings and
Impeding an Investigation.'^® It also deals with toughening the sentencing
guidelines for persons convicted of accounting fraud, securities fraud, or related
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offenses.49 Section 1103 prevents companies from making “extraordinary”
payments to persons who are the subjects of a lawful investigation®®, and Section
1105 gives the SEC the authority to prohibit a person who has committed a
51

violation of SEC rules or regulations,

Section 1107 returns to the issue of

retaliating against whistleblowers, and It outlines stiff penalties for anyone who
takes action to harm a whistleblower.52
It would seem that Title XI Is mostly housekeeping for items not directly
addressed in the preceding Titles.
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CHAPTER IV
A CHALLENGE TO THE ACT
THE CHALLENGE
In 2004, the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board cited a small
Nevada audit firm, Beckstead and Watts (the Firm), for deficiencies in the audits
inspected by the PCAOB. In 2006, along with the Free Enterprise Fund (the
Fund), the firm filed suit against the Board, claiming that it was an
unconstitutional entity. The plaintiffs claim of unconstitutionality was based on
an argument that the selection of PCAOB members and the limitations on their
removal violated the separation of powers doctrine. In 2004, Beckstead and
Watts was one of the first small auditing firms to be inspected by the PCAOB.
According to Brad Beckstead, the firm’s managing partner, “The inspection was
1*53

akin to the New York Giants playing the local high school in a game of football.
The Board released a report citing deficiencies in eight audits conducted by
Beckstead and Watts, and a formal Investigation was launched into the firm’s
audit practices.

However, in response to the launch of the formal investigation, Beckstead
and Watts sought out an ally to join them in a suit against the PCAOB,the Free
54

Enterprise Fund,

The Free Enterprise Fund, which was founded by economist

and political analyst Stephen Moore, is an organization that existed to oppose the

Court Rules PCAOB Constitutional, Accounting Today, Sept. 22, 2008, at 3.
Court Rules PCAOB Constitutional, Accounting Today, Sept. 22, 2008, at 3.
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government’s actions that interfere with the exercise of a free market. Actions
55

like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

The firm and the Fund challenged the constitutionality of the PCAOB’s
appointment and removal, and they believed that if these portions of the Act were
unconstitutional then the Board would be removed from power. The plaintiffs
argued that the Board members were unduly and unconstitutionally insulated
from the President’s right and duty to effectively hold members of the executive
56

branch accountable for executing the laws and policies of the United States.
Under Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley act as passed In 2002, members of the
Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board are to be selected by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and members of the PCAOB can only be
removed from their positions “for good cause shown in accordance with specified
procedures”.®^ This affords members of the PCAOB the same protections
offered to members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who can also
only be removed “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”.®® By
stipulating that members of the PCAOB can only be removed “for cause”.
Congress added a layer of Insulation to the members of the PCAOB, and the
plaintiffs argued that this second layer of “for cause” removal was
unconstitutional. If one follows the reasoning of the plaintiffs, if the President
cannot use the threat of termination at will to hold members of his branch of the
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government accountable, then there is a violation of his Constitutional authority
as the head of the executive branch. The firm and the Fund also argued that
allowing the Securities and Exchange Commission to appoint members of the
59

PCAOB violated the Appointments Clause,

The Appointments Clause

stipulates that the President may appoint officers with the advice and affirmation
of the Senate, and that the President, the Courts, or Department Heads can
appoint inferior officers. The petitioners argued that the Securities and Exchange
Commission was not a department head and therefore could not appoint inferior
60

officers.

Beckstead and Watts and the Free Enterprise Fund filed suit with the
United States District Court which held that Sarbanes-Oxley was constitutional,
and the firm and Fund appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington D.C.
However, while the petitioners believed that they had a case that could cripple or
fatally wound the PCAOB and Sarbanes-Oxley, they did not have the full support
of the accounting industry. “I didn’t see the Big Four jump in behind It. I don’t
think it was a largely held opinion in the profession. I’ve never heard anybody
else in the Industry speak out against how the PCAOB was formed and
structured,” said Peter lannone, a director at the consulting firm CBiz/Mayer
Hoffman McCann. The Court of Appeals seemed to agree that “how the PCAOB
was formed and structured” was not an issue, and It upheld the ruling of the
District Court. This decision was met with numerous statements of support from
the accounting industry and the federal government. Christopher Cox, the
Court Rules PCAOB Constitutional, Accounting Today, Sept. 22, 2008, at 3.
Court Rules PCAOB Constitutional, Accounting Today, Sept. 22, 2008, at 3.
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Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, hailed the decision as
»61

welcome news for the commission, investors, and U.S. capital markets.

The

executive director of the Center for Audit Quality, Cindy Fomelll, holds that the
decision “will benefit the stability of our capital markets.” The petitioners sought a
62

writ of certiorarifrom the Supreme Court of the United States.
THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court of the United States is endowed by Article III of the
Constitution of the United States of America and created by the Judiciary Act of
1789, Is the highest court In the United States. The Supreme Court of the United
States Is the final court that may be appealed to, and since Marbury v. Madison,
it has been the final arbiter and Interpreter of the United States Constitution. In
Marbury v. Madison, the Court created for itself the power of judicial review, and
that has been the primary avenue by which the Court has expressed its
63

interpretations of the Constitution since, While a longer discussion of the
powers of the federal judiciary could be had, it might not be appropriate in this
venue. Let it suffice to say that if the Supreme Court of the United States deems
that an act of the United States government or State government Is not allowed
by the Constitution of the United States, then it is not allowed. The only recourse
one would have if he or she disagrees with the ruling of the Supreme Court
would be to change the Constitution Itself. However, it is the concept of judicial
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review on which the fate of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act hinge.
THE OPINION

The Court granted a writ of certiorari Xo the case of Free Enterprise Fund
64

V. PCAOBand heard arguments on December 7, 2009.

In a 5-4 decision the

Court held that: 1) the lower courts had appropriate jurisdiction and authority to
hear and rule on the case, 2)that the removal limitations placed on PCAOB
members are unconstitutional, 3)that the unconstitutional portions of SarbanesOxley are severable from the remainder of the statute, 4) and that the method for
appointing members to the Board is not a violation of the Appointments Clause of
Article II of the Constitution. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court, and he was joined in the majority by Justices Alito, Kagan, Kennedy,
and Scalia. Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion, and he was joined In his
dissent by Justices GInsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens. However, the majority
and dissenting Justices all agree that this is a question of “first Impression” for
the Court.
The Court’s first holding in affirming the jurisdiction of the District Court is
an important point. Sarbanes-Oxley allows petitioning firms to appeal decisions
of the PCAOB to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and theoretically
firms could approach the courts for an appeal after the SEC rules. However, the
question is not one of the procedures of the Sarbanes-Oxley; it Is a question of

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.561 U.S.

130 S.Ct. 3138(2010).
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the constitutionality of the law. Therefore, since the Securities and Exchange
Commission does not have special knowledge or training In answering questions
of constitutionality, or any authority to decide such questions, the Federal
Judiciary is the appropriate arbiter of the question. The District Court decided
that it had jurisdiction over the matter, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.
65

and the Supreme Court reaffirmed it.

The second point that the Court decided was to reverse the decisions of
the lower courts that held Sarbanes-Oxley as completely Constitutional. While In
other cases, such as Myers v. United States, the Court has held that Congress
may limit the President’s removal power In the interest of officers being able to
perform their duties without being afraid of being removed without cause, the
Court held that by making the members of the PCAOB removable only “for
cause” by the Securities and Exchange Commissioners, who are also removable
66

only “for cause,” did indeed violate Article II of the Constitution,

The issue for

the Court was not that there were officers who could not be removed at will. The
issue was that there were two layers of officers who could not be removed at will.
They held that this double layer of protection could inhibit the President from
adequately holding his subordinates in the Executive branch accountable.
The respondents and dissenting Justices hold that such an arrangement Is
not unconstitutional, and that it is conducive to a “workable” government®^. From
an accounting standpoint, one might say that it is more useful to have PCAOB
65
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members who are insulated from removal by the President at will. From an
auditing standpoint, the added insulation would promote the Independence of the
board members, which would Increase the reliability of the PCAOB’s findings.
For example, suppose the PCAOB finds an auditing firm to be deficient in some
areas, launches an Investigation, and holds the firm and its officers criminally
liable under Sarbanes-Oxley. Now suppose that the President decides that he
disagrees with the PCAOB’s for no legitimate reason. If there were not a
provision that prevented him from doing so, he could remove any member, or all
members, of the PCAOB for no other reason than that he wishes to. Since the
PCAOB, which is basically a government body that audits auditors, could
potentially be intimidated by the threat of termination there would be a breach of
the auditor’s apparent Independence, which is more important than the actual
68

independence of the auditors.
In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts writes, “The people do
not vote for “Officers of the United States. They instead look to the President to
guide the assistants or deputies subject to his superintendence.” With a double
layer of “for good cause” protection, the President cannot adequately guide his
Inferior officers because he has no direct control over them. Roberts also
describes how by creating an executive agency without executive accountability
Congress increases its own power by diminishing the President’s. If there is no
check on the PCAOB by the President, then the only check on them is on their
budget, and since Congress holds the purse strings the PCAOB is an executive
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,561 U.S.

130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010).
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agency that Is only answerable to Congress.

The dissenting justices argue that

the PCAOB is an agency that requires very technical abilities that it Is acceptable
for it to have such a degree of independence. However, while it may be useful to
have an independent organization like the PCAOB, It is not in keeping with the
70

ideals of the Constitution of the United States.

However, despite reversing the rulings of two lower courts, the fact that
the Court held that the unconstitutional portions of the law are severable from the
remainder of the statute is perhaps the most important holding. Since the
removal limitations issue is severable from the law as a whole, the PCAOB can
continue functioning to insure that auditors are auditing correctly. This
severability allows the Board to continue to exist and function; however it
operates without the dual layers of protection of removal that were written Into
71

the original law.

THE DISSENT

While the Court did rule that the majority of Sarbanes-Oxley was
constitutional, the decision to sever a portion of the Act and declare It
unconstitutional did cause a split in the Court. Justice Breyer writes that the legal
issue arises from the “intersection of two general constitutional principles.” The
dissenting Justices hold that the conflict Is between the Constitution’s vesting of
each branch of government with its own powers and responsibilities and
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Congress’s power to create “necessary and proper"’ statutes^^. The dissenting
Justices believe that the power of Congress to create “necessary and proper”
statutes trumps the separation of powers principle. According to the dissent, the
Court should not look to “bright-line rules” but rather the “function and context” of
a statute and its provisions when deciding if Congress can limit the power of the
President over his Inferior officers^^.

While it is the purview of the Court to decide which portions of the
Constitution are more applicable in deciding the constitutionality of a piece of
legislation, the “necessary and proper” clause should not trump the overarching
theme of checks and balances that permeates our Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this writing was to explore the causes and effects of The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The causes of the Act were the series of financial
scandals that rocked the American financial landscape in the early years of the
new millennium. The scandals involving Enron and WorldCom were two of the
largest financial scandals in American history, and these two scandals gravely
Injured the public’s perception of accountants as trustworthy stewards of financial
information. The corrupt practices at Enron not only brought down an enormous
energy and commodities company, but It brought down Arthur Andersen, which
was once one of America’s most well respected accounting firms. WorldCom
executives and accountants engaged in fraud that possibly eclipsed the acts
committed at Enron and sent the company and many of its employees into
bankruptcy. As a Mississippian, I am especially sensitive to the effects that
WorldCom had on my home state and Its citizens.
The cause of these scandals can be cited as falsifying information to meet
earnings expectations, but the most basic reasons are much more simple and
primal than that: greed and fear. I will not presume to say which force motivated
which people, but it is clear to me that these were motivating forces, The men
and women involved in these events were ordinary men and women no matter
how much money was In their bank accounts or what letters came after their
names. They were vulnerable to greed and fear like every other human. Does
that make them any better or any worse than any other people? That is not for
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me to judge. I do know that these people were trusted with a fiduciary duty to
their employees and shareholders and that they failed In fulfilling their duty.
However, in Enron and WorldCom we see another side of human nature
brought forth In the face of adversity: that of the whistleblower. In each case,
employees of the company risked their careers and reputations to bring these
scandals to light. These Individuals displayed courage and commitment to the
truth, which are essential In anyone who is to be trusted with the money of
another. That means that these are essential characteristics of those who would
be called accountants and auditors of companies.
If accountants and auditors cannot be trusted to courageously pursue the
truth, then they cannot be trusted to fulfill their obligations to those who rely on
the financial information they provide. If an accountant or auditor cannot be
trusted, then he or she Is useless in those positions. For that reason, I contend
that the extra requirements that Sarbanes-Oxley created for companies and audit
firms promote the accountability of public companies and the auditors of public
companies, and that extra accountability provides a benefit to the users of
financial Information presented by public companies and their auditors.
For 115 years the AlCPA governed the accounting profession, but
Sarbanes-Oxley created the PCAOB as a government entity to enforce
accounting standards. While the PCAOB adopted the standards of the AlCPA
almost verbatim, it gave those standards the force of law. The restrictions that
the Act created above the existing regulations also increased the amount of
accountability that the government required for companies to have when they
38

filed their annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. By
holding public companies and their auditors criminally liable for failing to uphold
accounting standards the government increases the amount of accountability
among companies and firms.
However, while increased accountability is beneficial to the Investing
public, at what cost does It come? When Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, the
double “for cause” limitations on the PCAOB members’ removals should have
raised a major red flag. I agree with Chief Justice Roberts, if Congress can
create an executive agency that is not answerable to the Chief Executive, then
why would it not create others? To me, it is a clear violation of “Separation of
Powers”, and it should have been recognized as such before nearly a decade
had passed. An executive agency that has the ability to create policies and
enforce them without Executive oversight has no accountability, and it Is
especially hypocritical since Sarbanes-Oxley purportedly seeks to increase
accountability.
However, after the United States Supreme Court ruled to amend the law
to reflect the adequate level of accountability, I believe that Sarbanes-Oxley and
the PCAOB will continue to be powerful agents of accountability in the United
States economy.
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